Cynics have argued that if Tolstoy were to publish his novel *War and Peace* today, he would probably have chosen “Peace-Restoring and Peace-Keeping Missions” as a title. The notion of war is increasingly banned from the official political vocabulary, and we are more and more using expressions such as “restoring peace” when talking about the use of armed force in conflict. To put it even more clearly, we are using the word “peace” when meaning “war” (Hippler and Vec 2014). It would be an error, however, to presume that this inversion of meaning is just a matter of intellectual dishonesty. There is good reason to believe, on the contrary, that this semantic confusion has to be understood as being part of a particular conceptualization of what “peace” actually is. This paper will address some evolutions in the conceptual history of peace, admittedly in a fragmentary form.¹ In a first step, I will point out some features of medieval peace concepts, before turning, in a second step, to early modern developments of “internal” and “external peace.”
The last section will address Enlightenment concepts of peace, including Kant’s famous Perpetual Peace. In all these cases, I will try to establish a parallel between conceptual and visual history, through the analysis of particularly striking images in which peace is represented.

1.

Pax Romana had been a central part of the official ideology of the Roman Empire since its inception. However, the word *pax* (peace), and even more the verb *pacifari* (to pacify), clearly conveyed a hardly dissimulated justification for political domination. In his political will, the Res Gestae, Emperor Augustus, thus described his military conquests as the advent of peace: “I extended the boundaries of all the provinces which were bordered by races not yet subject to our empire. The provinces of the Gauls, the Spains, and Germany, bounded by the ocean from Gades to the mouth of the Elbe, I reduced to a state of peace (pacavi).”

Hence, it is no surprise that the very concept of peace became suspect. *Pax* clearly signified Pax Romana, and as such, it was the outcome of violent submission and, indeed, of a criminalization of any potential enemy. Peace, in short, was an ideological construction for purposes of imperial domination. This explains a very interesting twist in the conceptual history of peace during the later antiquity. The most interesting—and indeed one of the most influential texts until today—is certainly Augustine’s *Civitas Dei* (*The City of God*). Roman etymologies insisted on the link between *pax* and *pactum* (contract or treaty) and derived both from the verb *pango*, to bind. Thus, “peace” clearly involved the existence of asymmetrical power-relations and, as such, *pax* was a concept that designed social and political realities: there could be peace between humans.

This changed in the Christian outlook. Peace would now become a cosmic principle and was conceived of as being at the foundation of an ontological order. Christian authors were obviously drawing heavily on the platonic tradition here. Plato conceived of reality in ideal terms. “Ideas” as cosmic principles are the most “real” things in Plato’s philosophy. The lower, earthly things are nothing but pale copies of this ideal reality. Plato famously spelled this out
in his analogy of the cave in chapter 7 of *The Republic*. Something very similar happened with the concept of peace in Augustine. Augustine’s thinking about peace has been of crucial importance until today.\(^3\)

Augustine places peace on top of all other values; it is indeed said to be the highest of all goods.\(^4\) It is also an ontological category that defines “being,” as such.\(^5\) There is no being without peace, and this principle holds for the cosmos in general, as well as for particular beings, because a “peaceful” assemblage of elements constitutes an entity, as such. Augustine defines peace as “tranquility of order” (*tranguillitas ordinis*). But what is “order” in this framework? Drawing on Plato, he defines order as “the disposition of all things according to their place.”\(^6\) The three concepts of order, justice, and peace basically signify the same thing: a hierarchically ordered cosmos. In other words, we have a conceptual triangle of peace, order, and justice. In Augustine the center of this cosmos is obviously God. In God there is perfect order, there is perfect justice, and there is perfect and eternal peace. Augustine actually considers that perfect peace exists only in God, which means that all earthly manifestations of peace are nothing but pale and, indeed, imperfect copies of this eternal and thus true peace.

This is an important figure of thought that is still very much used today; in most cases, however, without knowing its platonic and Christian origins: the truth of a thing or a concept is in its eternal idea and the earthly realizations are characterized by *privatio*: all earthly things are deprived of parts of their ideal reality. Augustine, thus, distinguishes between “eternal peace” (*pax aeterna*), which can be realized only in God, and earthly, “temporal peace” (*pax temporalis*), which might be a reality for humans.

Temporal, in this sense, is to be understood in a twofold sense: human peace was temporal as opposed to the divine eternal peace, and it was also temporal in the sense that it was always fragile. Peace among humans, in other words, was always threatened by the evil in human nature, and there was always a risk of conflict to occur. The divine eternal peace could never be established on earth, but there could be an intuition of it within the individuals’ souls. Christians had an image of God’s cosmic order, justice, and peace in their souls. And this image would influence on their moral behavior.

In other words, on the scale of realities, there is on top the cosmic ideal (in
Plato) or God (in Augustine and the Christian tradition). One step below, there is the Christian moral being, that is, a person who can have an intuition of good and who can—never perfectly, but at least to a certain degree—act in conformity to this idea. Below this individual moral sphere of the Christian soul, a social reality is shaped by the degree of conformity of behavior to the cosmic idea or God. There are, accordingly, three levels of peace: cosmic peace, moral peace in the Christian soul, and, at the bottom, pax civilis, social peace.

After the distinction between eternal and temporal peace and the platonic theory diminishing degrees of reality, Augustine distinguished, quite paradoxically between “just peace” on the one hand, and “unjust peace” on the other. Peace as a cosmic principle is present in all kinds of reality, because every being consists of necessity in an ordered assemblage of parts. As a consequence, there is peace even among brigands, beasts, the mean, heathens, and the devil, but the peace of the unjust does not really merit the name of peace. The conceptual triangle of peace, order, and justice is, thus, considerably modified, because justice is not any more a distinctive feature for peace in general but only for “just peace.” This latter is understood as a well-ordered concord in command and obedience, whereas the former fits to a region of being that does not correspond to the norms of order and justice in general. If this distinction between just and unjust peace might sound incongruent with the conceptual triangle of peace, order, and justice, there is an obvious historical reason for Augustine to consider “unjust peace” nevertheless as “peace.” Traditional (that is, pagan) Pax Romana, obviously falls into the category of unjust peace because even if unjust in its foundations, the Roman Empire obviously provided a political order of peace, even during its pagan period. The emanatist structure of peace—from God, to the human soul, and finally to the social body—served as a firm linkage of peace to the religious sphere of Christendom.

A just order, in other words, was obviously a Christian order. The explicit theological foundation of these conceptions of peace will later disappear; what will not disappear, however, is the religious subtext of peace. During the Middle Ages, a true peace, because it relied on this religious foundation, was deemed possible only among Christians. The simple reason for this was the
fact that there was no just order on which Christians could interact with other religions. In other words, there was a spatial dimension of peace: peace was local, and it was confined to the res publica Christiana. Besides being spatially defined, earthly peace also had temporal boundaries (see Janssen 1975). Peace could occur at a certain time, and for a certain time, and at a certain place—which means in turn that there were spaces outside in which there was no peace.

If Augustine’s conceptualization remained influential, the Middle Ages witnessed, however, a progressive re-evaluation of the virtues of temporal peace. This is clearly a consequence of the fact that, in contrast with the situation, Augustine’s late antiquity, in which Christians cohabited with heathens, had ended. Christianity had become not only the dominant religion, but the sole religion in Europe. From then on, social peace (pax socialis), invested with the attributes of tranquillity (tranquilītās), security (securītās), justice (iusstitiā), and eventually charity (caritās), was also conceived as enabling humans to achieve their true humanity (humanītās). In other words, in contrast to the emanantist Augustianian framework, a retroaction from the bottom to the top became conceivable. Aquinas thus reconceptualized Augustine’s distinction between just and unjust peace as a dichotomy between “true peace” (pax vera) and “apparent peace” (pax apparens). The defining criterion between the two was once more “justice,” which was in turn defined with a reference to God. As a consequence, there was no true peace but in God and, thus, inside of the “Christian commonwealth,” the Res Publica Christiana.

An interesting visualization of these concepts can be found, toward the end of the Middle Ages, in the frescos “The Good and the Bad Government” by Ambrogio Lorenzetti. Lorenzetti lived from 1290 to 1348, and he depicted frescos in Room of the Nine (Sala dei Nove) or Room of Peace (Sala della Pace) of the city hall (Palazzo Pubblico) of Siena. Lorenzetti depicted analogies of the good and of the bad government, each one completed by two other frescos, representing the effects of the good and of the bad government in the city and on the countryside (Skinner 1986; Kühr 2002; Schmidt 2003). The central analogy of the good government is particularly interesting for our purpose (Fig. 1.)
The analogy of the good government is dominated by two figures: Justice (iustitiae), on the left hand, with the attribute of the balance, and Harmony (concordia), sitting center-right amid the other virtues and being represented in a larger scale than the others. As to Justice, it immediately strikes that her eyes are turned to the personification of the divine wisdom above her, with a crown on her head and holding a book in her hands. It is actually divine wisdom, and not justice, who holds the balance. On each side of the balance sits an angel representing the two sides of Aristotelian justice (i.e., “distributive justice” on the left and “commutative justice” on the right). A rope links both sides of the balance to the figure of Harmony, passing through a chain of citizens of Siena, symbolizing different social positions and professions. The meaning is clear: justice leads to harmony among the citizens, but justice depends in the last instance on God and the Scriptures.

Harmony, however, is not the only virtue. The three theological virtues of Faith, Hope, and Charity are represented with wings above and beside the head of Harmony. Moreover, six other personifications are sitting next to her. At the very right of the fresco, we have once more Justice—but is the institutional sense of jurisdiction, with the attributes of the sword, the crown, and the head. To her right we see Temper, with the hourglass, and then Magnanimity. At the other side of Harmony, we see Prudence with a mirror and Fortitude with a shield. Lastly, we see Peace in a white dress. She obviously has a special status here: although part of the virtues below the throne, she is
nevertheless remote from the others, and she is sitting in a distinctly different position on pillows. Below her feet, we see parts of armor and a helmet: war has been defeated. More importantly, she is situated exactly in the middle of the whole fresco, while her eyes are directed outside of the frame of the picture. She is actually looking at the next fresco, to the effects of the good government. The personification of peace in the first fresco thus assures the narrative coherence of the whole series of pictures (see Kater 2003). The allegory shows which normative criteria have to be fulfilled to achieve peace, justice, and social harmony, and the following pictures display the effects.

The general structure of the fresco is divided into three parts: the divine upper part, with the representations of divine wisdom on the left and of the three theological virtues on the right; the representations of the virtues in the middle part; and finally, at the bottom, the citizens on the left and the army on the right. Materially situated in the middle, Peace provides the spiritual meaning of the good government: surrounded by justice, harmony, and by divine protection and a concrete social structure, she represents a somewhat psychologic realm of human happiness. Christian interior peace within a well-ordered cosmos and a well-ordered society directly hints toward the idyllic representations of peace in the city and on the countryside in the following frescos (Figs. 2 and 3).

Given this framework of concepts and of representations, it is not astonishing that the religious reformation had had a disastrous effect on the very definition of peace. If peace relied on justice, and justice on Christianity, it was now unclear what Christianity meant, and conversely, what the foundations of justice could be (Janssen 1975, 556). The unleashed violence of the religious civil wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was a consequence of the changing nature of the enemy within this framework. Taking the risk of oversimplification, we can say that there were two types of war in the medieval mindset.

On the one hand, there were wars with other religions, typically Crusades that could precisely be waged in the name of the Christian conception of peace. Crusades were “wars for peace” so to speak, to the extent that they aimed at broadening the common ground on which true peace was possible, and this common ground was obviously the Christian religion. On the other hand, there were wars within Christianity. These were of a completely different kind. The crucial difference was that the second type of war, that is, wars among Christians, took place under the umbrella of a commonly shared normative order, whereas war with heathens was not only waged outside of such an umbrella of a normative order, but also the normative order in itself was even the object of war.
With regard to wars among Christians, there were degrees within the very normative order of Christianity. In other words, there was not a simple duality between war on the one hand and peace on the other, but the legitimacy and, hence, the intensity of conflict was always linked to a concrete ground of legitimacy, order, and justice. The so-called “domestic peace,” that is, peace under the jurisdiction of a local Lord, excluded any form of violence. Other forms of peace, however, did not rule out violence as such (for instance, what the German language called Landfriede, or the Latin juridical language called constitutio pacis). Different forms of feud were permissible within the framework of this form of peace, which applied among different local lords. Feud is a kind of legal argument between two clans normally under the authority of a lord. However, it is a legal argument without any centralized form of jurisdiction. Feud, vendetta, and consequently, peace, are conceivable only within a framework of legitimacy and justice. In other words, peace was always dependent on a concrete legal order that more or less permitted intense forms of violent conflict (Janssen 1975, 556).

Medieval thinking does not distinguish between legal and legitimate orders or between justice and jurisdiction, and this legal and normative order was in the last instance linked to the overwhelming unity of Christianity, which depended finally on the supreme authority of the Roman Church. There was, however, a third type of conflict, and this was waged against a paradoxical enemy who was both within and without this normative order. This third type of conflict was war against heretics. The supreme authority could exclude heretics from the Christian community, and in this case, an absolute war of destruction could be waged against them, which meant that these wars were particularly bloody. The religious civil wars that took place within this traditional normative order could, to some extent, be assimilated to these wars against heretics (see Crouzet 1990). When the unity of Christendom was destroyed, there was no longer common ground on which a common justice could be conceived. Accordingly, there was no longer any harmony (concordia). The religious civil wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were thus fundamentally different from medieval forms of conflict among Christians. They actually resembled either Crusades or wars of extermination like the ones that had been waged against medieval heretics. The reason was
precisely that there was no normative umbrella of a commonly shared order anymore. Even worse, the definition of what this order was, and should be, was precisely the object of the religious and civil wars. The result was a complete overthrow of the medieval framework of peace relying on a just order.

The development of modern territorial states, and their claimed monopoly of the means of physical violence, shifted the problem of peace from a theological grounding to a purely state-centered foundation. The modern state was legitimate to the extent to which it was capable of ending the domestic violence of the religious civil wars. The outcome was a complete conceptual overthrow. War and peace now belonged to the realm of international relations, and they defined a relation between states. This development can be illustrated through two famous images, the first one being the frontispiece of Thomas Hobbes’s *Leviathan, or the matter, form, and power of a commonwealth ecclesiastical and civil*, and the second Gerard Ter Borch’s representation of the peace of Münster of 1648. The first of these images corresponds to a redefinition of “internal peace.” In late Antiquity and during the Middle Ages, “internal” referred to the inner moral sphere of the soul that, to be in peace, had to obey divine orders. From the early modern period onward, the meaning of the expression changes completely, and “internal peace” now denotes the absence of civil war. The second image, by contrast, represents “external peace.”

The most accomplished theoretical expression of the view according to which the state gets its legitimacy from its capacity to end civil discordance is certainly to be found in the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes (Bredekamp 2007, 2006). The etching of the frontispiece of Hobbes’s *Leviathan* was made by the Parisian Abraham Bosse in close collaboration with Hobbes himself, and it is one of the most striking and most famous examples of modern political iconography (Fig. 4).

The picture is divided into two parts. The lower part is framed in contrast to the upper part. In the middle, we see a curtain with a text written on it. The picture, thus, represents in itself the text of the book: the curtain represents obviously a sort of entrance into the philosophical text or, in other words, the theoretical argument is in itself visually represented. On the lower left side, we see symbols of earthly power: a castle, a crown, a cannon, weapons, and a
scene of battle. Conversely, we see symbols of ecclesiastical power on the lower right side: a church, a mitre (a Bishop’s hat), an anathema (as a symbol of ban and of excommunication), furthermore, and more surprisingly perhaps, the weapons of logic, as well as a theological disputation in an academic framework. There is, thus, a perfect correspondence between the attributes of civil and ecclesiastical power.

On the upper side, we see the Leviathan himself with the sword as the attribute of civil power and the crosier as attribute of ecclesiastical power. His body is composed of a multiplicity of individuals seen from the back. However, neither his head nor his hands are composed of individuals. The Leviathan is thus a composed being, but he is more than its parts. This in an image of complete domination: the figure is overwhelmingly dominant with regard to the city in the forefront and the countryside behind. His relation to the sea behind, however, is less clear. At the same time, it is not only an image of domination, but also an image of protection. And in this sense, the representation of the city and of the countryside, is also an image of peace.

As can easily be seen, this representation of peace is completely different from Lorenzetti’s. In Lorenzetti, and especially in the “Effects of Good Government,” both in the city and on the countryside, peace was related to concrete social realities, and we saw people being peacefully together in their daily activities. In Hobbes, by contrast, we see hardly any human beings at all. The countryside is completely empty, whereas there are two doctors in front of the church with masks protecting their faces. Finally, there are a couple of soldiers toward the fortifications at the left. This is certainly no coincidence, and it actually matches perfectly with Hobbes’s definition of politics. The state, as it is represented here, functions like a cold and ultimately nonhuman machine. And the sphere of politics, constituted by the machine of the state, actually excludes anything that is “private.” Even more, it excluded all social reality, in contrast to the political reality of the state. Consequently, everything that is “private” or even social disappears from the visual representation.

With regard to Lorenzetti’s fresco, there is clearly a loss of substance here. Lorenzetti’s medieval peace was relying on normative principles, and it was producing substantial social benefits like a peaceful being together, joy, wealth, and so forth. Hobbes’s peace, by contrast, no longer relies on any normative principles,
and it does not produce anything but—precisely peace, however, clearly a sort of empty peace. In conceptual terms, the reference to a normative and substantial definition of justice disappears in Hobbes. This is an obvious reaction to the religious civil wars and the uncertainty of what justice is or may be. What becomes important, in contrast to the traditional concept of justice, is the concept of security, defined not in substantial but in material terms: security is both objective (a factual state of security) and subjective (a feeling of protection against attack). With regard to earlier conceptions of war and peace, there is a symptomatic narrowing of meaning in Hobbes. Peace is a state in which security is guaranteed. By contrast, in chapter 13 (“Of the Natural Condition of Mankind as Concerning Their Felicity and Misery”) of the first part of *Leviathan*, Hobbes defines war as follows: “So the nature of War consisteth not in actual fighting; but in the known disposition thereto during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is peace” (Locke 203: 101–02). There is thus a radical conceptual shift in the meaning of peace. Since Augustine, “true peace” had been understood as relying on justice in the Christian sense, and this true peace could produce tranquillity, order, and security. At the time of Hobbes, peace and security were becoming the key concepts. It did not matter anymore if there “true peace” existed, and peace did not refer anymore to any kind of “truth” or eternal justice. What matters is that peace is effective, and that it is actually able to produce security. Even more, only if there is peace and security can there be justice—however not in a substantial sense of true justice, but in a very material sense of working jurisdictions. Blaise Pascal famously expressed this new concept of the modern state in the following terms: “being unable to cause might to obey justice, men have made it just to obey might. Unable to strengthen justice, they have justified might; so that the just and the strong should unite, and there should be peace, which is the sovereign good” (Pascal, Pensées, V, 229, see also Janssen 1975 and Lazzeri 1993). The sarcastic tone nevertheless matches well the functioning of peace within the framework of the absolutist state.

Early modern peace, however, does not consist only in domestic peace, but there is equally a reconfiguration of peace on the international scene. Gerard Ter Borch, in his depiction of the peace of Münster in 1648, famously represents this other side of early modern peace (Fig. 5).

The scene depicts the separate peace between the Spanish Crown and the
United Provinces, in which Netherlands gained its independence from Spanish rule. An issue of the conflict had been the reconnaissance of Calvinism as religion in the United Provinces. The painter himself witnessed the scene that took place on May 15, 1648 in the city hall of Münster in Westphalia. This image was very widely diffused in various versions, and thus, might have had a considerable impact on contemporary representations. Ter Borch does not display the effects of peace in a mythological and idealized form, as most of the earlier representations of peace had done, but he depicts the signing of the treaty—and indeed the swearing of an oath—in itself. The image actually resembles today’s photographs shot at the occasion of meetings of international top decision makers.

Center stage of the left, we see the Dutch diplomats with their hands up in the air, whereas the Spanish delegation swears the oath with their hands on the Bible. We also see priests of the different Christian confessions. Several things are striking here, above all, the fact that peace is no longer depicted as
a substantial entity. There is no personification of peace. In contrast, peace is achieved among actors that were formerly in a state of war. What is striking in this image, moreover, is its symmetry. There does not seem to be a victor and a defeated party, but a community of equals. Neither party is depicted as more legitimate than the other. This is even more astonishing, because it was not only a war of independence, but also a religious war, that is, in today’s parlance, a conflict for “identity politics.” In this respect, this painting is perhaps the best illustration of what is commonly associated with the peace treaties of 1648: the mutual recognition of sovereign states."

The common ground of internal and of external peace—as represented by the frontispiece of the Leviathan and of Münster in 1648—is that both relied on treaties or contracts. In this respect, a very old tradition was revived. In the Roman political language, pax was derived from pactum, and pactum can be translated either by contact or by treaty. Both meanings were present in the modern political language, but on two distinct levels. On the innerstate level, the construction of Hobbesian “peace and security” relied on the theoretical construction of the “social contract.” In contrast to this very theoretical construction, the link was much more material on the level of external peace. External peace, or “international peace” as we would say today, relied on treaties. At this level, however, the early modern conception of pactum differs radically from the Roman conception in which treaties merely gave a sanction to acts of submission to imperial dominion.

To sum up: since the Christian concepts of the Middle Ages, the concept of internal peace referred to the moral individuality: internal meant internal to the Christian soul. If the Christian was in peace with his or her soul and, thus, with God, there could be external peace; that is, there could be peace among humans. This refers to the tripartition of cosmic, moral, and social peace. During the early modern era, the meaning of these concepts completely changed, and during the seventeenth century, the concepts of internal and external peace acquired their modern sense. From this point, internal peace is peace within a society or within a state, whereas external peace is peace between societies, countries, or states. This change of meaning has obviously a very concrete historical background, which is the consolidation of effective state-power within given territories. Up to this point, war and peace were
concepts that related to the sphere of what would later be called “international relations.”

At the same time, however, the change in meaning of the concept of internal peace also indicates another development in political theory: as pointed out before, the religious civil wars had been waged in the name of a true and a just peace. In other words, this true and just peace led to extreme cruelty, devastation, and bloodshed. The answer of the absolutist state was to exclude the notions of true religion, of divine justice, and so forth from the political sphere of the state (see Koselleck 1988). The state was devoted only to guarantee security through working institutions. This, however, also implied that the inner moral space of the individuals was left blank. In contrast to medieval thinking, the individuals’ souls no longer mattered, and neither did their moral feelings or their religious or political opinions or convictions. There was, in other words, a divide between the state (which was peace), and the rest, which included opinions, religion, ideology, and even the whole sphere that we would today call society or “civil society.” The absolutist state excluded everything on which truth and justice relied within the individual. Truth and justice were inner moral values of the individuals’ opinions, religions, or ideologies, but they were, as such, excluded from the political sphere.

This was precisely the weak point of the construction. What happened with the Enlightenment, and then with an unforeseen political force during the French Revolution, was precisely a new articulation between state-power on the one hand, and this “inner moral space” of convictions, opinions, ideologies, and so forth on the other (Hippler 2008).

3.

During the later seventeenth and especially during the eighteenth centuries, a new genre of political discourse developed rapidly: peace projects, usually conceived of as peace projects for Europe. To be sure, there were already earlier attempts to draft proposals for regional unions with a view to establishing peace in Europe. One could think, for instance, of Pierre Dubois’s *De recuperatione terre sancte*, which was a pamphlet written around 1306 arguing for a European peace for the sake of crusade. To establish peace in Europe,
Dubois suggests to establish a council of arbitration, that should be in possession of the necessary means to enforce its decisions—by force if necessary. Dubois talks of reacting militarily against aggressors.\textsuperscript{12}

Another example is Erasmus’ \textit{Querela Pacis} which was much more moral and religious in tone and contained, in contrast to Dubois, few political or geostrategical analyses (Eliav-Feldon 1989). The famous “Grand Dessein” by Henri IV of France and his collaborator Sully is very different in this respect (see Burckhardt 1953, 14–49 and Hartmann 1995). According to Sully and Henri IV, peace in Europe could be achieved upon two conditions: first, that European powers not be too different in power and, second, that a single religion be practiced (Sully 1837, 353–55). The final purpose of this peace order was not entirely pacifistic, but consisted in setting up an alliance against the Hapsburg domination of Europe (Sully 1837, 430). If it were impossible to convince the Hapsburgs to voluntarily abandon parts of their possessions, the union of peace would wage a war to distribute their possessions among the victors. As a second step, Christianity would be able to make “conquests in the three other parts of the world, which are Asia, Africa and America” to “wage a continuous war against the infidel enemies of the sacred name of Jesus Christ” (Sully et al. 1837, 430 and 341).

Against these projects for strategic alliances that argue with the necessity to promote peace, Eméric Crucé’s \textit{Le Nouveau Cynée} of 1623 might be cited as a counterexample and indeed as a precursor of a new kind of discourse that largely prefigures peace projects of the eighteenth century (see Eliav-Feldon 1986, 29–44 and Hartmann 1995). Like those other peace planners, Crucé’s proposal was centered on the setting up of a supranational assembly with military forces at its disposal.\textsuperscript{13} The novelty of Crucé lies in two aspects of his plan: on the one hand, he argued for the acceptance of different religions within the European diet, which means that the horizon of \textit{Res Publica Christiana} as frontier of possible peace has definitely been abandoned (Saitta 1948). On the other hand, however, this religious foundation of peace had played a precise conceptual role, because the Christian reference had defined a commonly shared normative framework on which peace could be established. A question thus arises: which is the new normative ground for peace? And Crucé’s answer is astonishing in its modernity: it is commerce (that is,
economic free trade) that will provide this common ground. Hence the subtitle of his work: “means to establish a general peace, and liberty of commerce all over the world.”

Enlightenment peace projects are thus quite different from their precursors (see Hippler 2002). Peace has to be thought on other bases than as conquest, as in Sully’s Grand Dessein, for instance. Peace becomes, so to speak, an autonomous entity. An important shift takes place on the conceptual level. Up to this point, war and peace were conceived of as entities that mutually constitute themselves, but this mutual implication arguably changes during the Enlightenment period: from now on war and peace are not only antithetical but indeed separate concepts. As a consequence, they have to be understood according to different causalities. The causes of war are predominantly to be found in the “ambitions” of princes and kings, whereas the causes of peace are situated in the “peoples” and their concrete “interests” (Rousseau 1971, 349). As Albert Hirschmann (1977) has convincingly argued, the dichotomy between the passions and the interests provided an ideological foundation of capitalism before its triumph. In other words, the causes of war and of peace are now related to the development of capitalism. In the language of the period, this aspect was enounced through the concepts of the nation, and, more importantly, of (civil) society (see Riedel 1975). The interests of peoples and nations can be economic and moral, but both are actually intimately interwoven (Skornicki 2011). Passions, in contrast to interests, are not only irrational but actually immoral and antinatural.

Peace is the natural state of things among humans; war, by contrast is “antinatural,” it is contrary to the rules of humanity, rationality, civility, and rule of law. Moreover, war is “antisocial” to the extent that the concept of “society” is precisely defined by peace and justice. According to William Penn “peace is maintained by justice, which is a fruit of government, as government is from society, and society from consent” (Penn 1916, 6). This sentence can be considered the ideal type of the Enlightenment concept of peace. First of all the concept of justice—which had disappeared from the peace concepts of absolutism and had been replaced by jurisdiction—comes back in. Government that is capable of preventing civil war and that relied on justice has to rely on “society,” that is on an entity that is capable of integrating potentially
conflicting entities. As a consequence, peace is achieved if “society” can be exported to the supranational sphere.

The emergence of a “European society” had precisely been impeded by the wars that had positioned monarchs against each other to the detriment of peoples, nations, and societies (Voltaire 1963, vol. 2, 811). According to this teleological “enlightenment narrative” (O’Brien 1997) of the “progress of society,” these socializing powers would inevitably lead to a pacific integration of European nations into a single “body politic” (Robertson 1769, vol. 1, 18, 30 and 88). Europe is, in fact, a single nation divided into several states (Chabod 1967, 55–6): “It has been a long time that Christian Europe (with the exception of Russia) can be considered as a sort of great republic that is divided into several states,” Voltaire bluntly stated (1966, vol. 1, 40). On the conceptual level, peace now relies on the more fundamental concept of “society” that obviously draws on classical ideas of philia revived in particular during the Scottish Enlightenment through concepts of “sympathy” and of “moral sentiments” (Frazer 2010).

Accordingly, these Enlightenment concepts undermined the absolutist conception of peace relying on treaties. This Enlightenment contempt for pacta is clearly stated by the perhaps most influential peace theorist before Kant, the abbé de Saint-Pierre, according to whom peace treaties did not provide a sufficient degree of certainty, because they could easily be broken. He thus describes the political situation of Europe like a continuous state of war that is only temporarily interrupted by truces (Saint-Pierre 1981, 130; see also Asbach 2002). It can thus clearly be seen how the medieval distinction between true and false peace re-emerged, combined, however, with a theory of the social contract (as opposed to treaties between states) to disqualify the peace of treaties. The formerly “false peace” is nothing but a cease-fire, whereas “true peace” now involves something more than a treaty. The theory of the social contract, in other words, is applied to the international sphere.

Kant’s famous and very influential text on Perpetual Peace has to be regarded as being part of this larger Enlightenment discourse on perpetual peace (Bohman and Lutz-Bachmann 1997; Caranti 2006; see also Eberl 2008). Kant’s text contains no images in the strict sense—apart from the invocation of the “satirical inscription” on the sign of a Dutch inn, where the legend
“perpetual peace” appears above the image of a graveyard. However, an image that comes close to Kant’s concepts is an engraving by Bernard Picart at the frontispiece of the Corpus universel diplomatique du droit des gens by Jean Dumont, published in several volumes from 1726 onward (Fig. 6). In the center, we see two kings surrounded by ministers and councilors, whereas justice and peace are depicted as holding each other tight in the altar behind them. In the forefront, we see ambition, division, falsity, ruthlessness, and war in chains. The setting is a kind of temple or a theater, and there are personifications of the different virtues under each pillar of the temple. Interestingly, we find among these figures a personification of natural law (first on the left) and of international law (third on the right), and thus two concepts Kant mentions in the second definite article of his Perpetual Peace (Kaulbach 2003).

On the top in the middle, the divine eye of providence overwhelms the whole scene. Why is this necessary? Precisely to answer the question that was left blank in the Enlightenment peace projects and also in Kant; that is, the crucial legal question of “who decides”? The architectonic setting reminds us that peace relies on more than simple treaties, which, according to Saint-Pierre, did not provide sufficient security not to be broken one day. In Kant’s formulation (first preliminary article), this idea reads as follows: “No secret treaty of peace shall be held valid in which there is tacitly reserved matter for a future war.” Mark the contrast with medieval concepts of peace, where peace was always local and temporal.

However, the contrast with early modern concepts of peace as relying on treaties of international law is equally striking. The overwhelming architecture of the setting precisely indicates that peace is more than a treaty. On the contrary, it is located within its own temple, the pillars of which are—quite literally—virtues, morale, philosophy, and legal principles. What we can see is thus a quite hybrid construction, consisting of the signing of a treaty in an idealized form that is, at the same time, clearly depicted as something more and something different from an act of international relations between sovereigns. The point is that these sovereigns, while remaining the subjects of peace, are depicted as dwelling within a temple of substantial principles that are of peace and justice. In Kant’s words, we would say that peace is a moral
duty. Concretely, his text on Perpetual Peace—and the same actually holds true for the rest of his political texts (see Hippler 2008)—functions as a reminder of this duty to those in power. Peace, as well as Kant’s “republicanism”—and which he carefully distinguishes from “democracy”—is founded as an idea of practical reason, whereas reason sits, in Kant’s own words, on “the throne of the highest morally legislative power.”

What Kant terms “reason” and “morality” has been called “civic bond” “sympathy,” “civil society” by other Enlightenment thinkers, and will soon be addressed as the “nation.” And all these concepts have a clear economic implication. Moreover, religion progressively disappears from the justification narrative for peace and is replaced by more “universal” concepts. This can already be observed during the eighteenth century, when the traditional principle of peace in a union among Christians is gradually abandoned. If the religious reference can be found, it is used as a cultural rather than as a religious category (Rousseau 1971, 336 and 340). Christianity, in short, refers to a common history and to common values. Consequently, these commonly shared values can either be enounced in the language of Christian religion or in the language of universally shared reason.

Be it as religion or as universal reason and morality, it is a duty to establish peace in the international realm. Kant himself is rather evasive as to the question how this should be done concretely. Other Enlightenment thinkers on whom he drew to elaborate his peace project were more explicit in many regards and their reasoning reads as follows. Because peace and related concepts, such as civil society, are substantial values, they need to be defended if possible. Through what theorists of international relations call the “domestic analogy” (see Bottici 2009), it is the role of some supranational power to defend these substantial values if threatened. If a political entity breaches the peaceful order “all the other sovereignties, united as one strength, shall compel the submission and performance of the sentence, with damages to the suffering party, and charges to the sovereignties that obliged their submission” (Penn 1916, 8). According to others, each citizen is, in this case, even individually responsible for the warlike actions of their governments (Bouchard 1777, 476).

If peace and justice define the international order, the use of armed force
is necessarily unjust. Consequently, war is *ipso facto* antisocial and even inhuman: according to the international lawyer Vattel, those who breach peace are nothing other than “cruel enemies of humankind and should be treated as such” (Vattel 1863, vol. 3, 169). If the peaceful order is a just order, it follows necessarily from this that any breach of this order is unjust. Moreover, if humanity is defined by the fact that humankind live peacefully together according to a just social order, it follows from this that anyone who troubles this order excludes themselves from humankind. It is precisely in this respect that a more substantial as well as ethically more ambitious construction of peace also runs the risk of deepening exclusions: in the end the enemy might even be denied humanity.

NOTES

1. Wilhelm Janssen’s entry “Friede” in the *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe* remains crucial for the conceptual history of peace until today.
4. “We might say, therefore, of peace . . . that it is the end of all our good,” Augustine, *The City of God*, book 19, chap. 11.
5. “persons who have some natural being, for they could not exist if there were not some sort of peace to hold them together,” Augustine, *The City of God*, book 19, chap. 13.
7. “In other words, it abhors the just peace of God, and loves its own unjust peace; but peace, of some kind or other, it cannot help loving. . . . He, then, who knows enough to prefer right to wrongs and the orderly to the perverse, sees that the peace of the unjust, compared to the peace of the just, does not deserve the name of peace at all,” Augustine, *The City of God*, book 19, chap. 13.
8. “*Si enim concordet cum alio non spontanea volatate, sed quasi coactus timore alicuius mali imminentis, talis concordia non est vere pax.*” Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, 2.2, qu. 29, art. 2; on the distinction between *vera pax* and *pax apparens*, see Janssen 1975: 549–50.
9. “*pax vera non potest esse nisi in bonis et bonorum.*” Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, 2.2, qu. 29, art. 2
The following paragraph draws on Kater 2003 and on Bredekamp 2007.

This traditional view of the history of international relations has recently been challenged. See Teschke 2003.

“remedium manus militaris, tamquam iusticia neccessario complusiva” (Dubois 1891: 96).

“Ceste compagnie donc [...] iroit au devant des mescontentemens et les appaiseroit par la voye de douceur, si faire se pouuoit, ou en cas de necessité par la force.” (Crucé 1623: 73).


For instance, in Sieyès famous 1789 pamphlet *What is the Third Estate:* “Qui oserait dire que le tiers état n’a pas en lui tout ce qu’il faut pour former une nation complète?” Emmanuel Sieyès, *Qu’est-ce que le Tiers État?* (1789) (Paris: PUF, 1982), p. 30. If Adam Smith talked about The Wealth of Nations, “nation” in this context is primarily to be understood as “society” or “civil society.” The English language has kept this meaning of “the nation,” as can be seen in the title of Benjamin Disraeli’s novel *Sybil, or the Two Nations* or the current of the “One-Nation Tories” during the 1980 which is directly derived from Disraeli.

REFERENCES


