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Heroism and the Nation during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars and the Age of Military Reform in Europe

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I

17 According to a common understanding, European wars in the period from
18 the French Revolution to the mid-twentieth century were national wars.
19 One nation attacked another and war was fought for the sake of the nation.
20 Things seem to have completely changed today: not only has coalition
21 warfare become the rule and wars of one nation against another much less
22 frequent, it even appears that 'nation-building' – for instance in a country
23 like Afghanistan – became part of a 'peace building' strategy. Thus the refer-
24 ence to the nation has completely changed its meaning: from a motivation
25 for war, and even for total war, to a ground on which peace is to be built. In
26 order to understand this apparent paradox, it is necessary to enquire what
27 historical actors were actually talking about when invoking the nation as a
28 motivation for fighting, for heroism and for self-sacrifice. Many scholars of
29 the nation and of nationalism have underlined that it is quite difficult to
30 define the nation. However, a basic understanding today seems to involve a
31 definition of the nation as people sharing a territory, a common language and
32 culture, as well as some community of ethnic descent. It is immediately clear
33 that processes of globalization and of migration have effectively challenged
34 this meaning today. However, it is the contention of this chapter that the
35 nation was right from the onset an unstable ground for a motivation to fight
36 and that the concept carried multiple and partly contradictory meanings
37 that have always been incompatible with the above-outlined understanding
38 of the nation and of nationalism. More precisely, if any motivation to fight
39 could be derived from a reference to the nation, this term should be under-
40 stood in a strictly political sense, rather than in ethnic, cultural or linguistic
41 terms. In order to illustrate this, I will analyse some contemporary references
42 to 'nationalism' as an impetus for war, derived from different contexts and
43 by different actors: political decision-makers, public intellectuals and soldiers
44 themselves.¹

II

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3 My first example is from the time of the Seven Years War and more precisely
4 from 1761.² Prussian writer Thomas Abbt published a patriotic pamphlet
5 entitled *Vom Tode für das Vaterland* (*On Death for the Fatherland*), which was,
6 to my knowledge, the first modern expression in the German lands of the
7 idea that the fatherland was something worth fighting and dying for.³ In
8 order to make this idea acceptable, Abbt had to confront a crucial question:
9 did Prussian subjects have a fatherland at all? The question may sound unre-
10 lated to our conceptual framework in which the nation related to culture,
11 language, territory and ethnic descent. But the question was not without
12 meaning in the eighteenth century. Following a traditional argument, only
13 citizens of republics were seen to have a fatherland, whereas subjects of
14 monarchies did not. A fatherland, and thus a nation in the modern sense,
15 only exists when the individual is politically linked to the state.

16 In order to make his point and to demonstrate that Prussian subjects not
17 only had a fatherland, but that this fatherland was even something worth
18 dying for, Abbt had to confront the common opinion at his time that a
19 monarchical fatherland was nothing but ‘an empty fantasy’, that is pure
20 ideology.⁴ Abbt drew heavily on Montesquieu for whom ‘honour’ was the
21 basic mental disposition on which monarchical statecraft relied.⁵ However,
22 in contrast to Montesquieu, Abbt argued that each citizen should be to some
23 degree a bearer of honour. National honour, as embodied by the monarch and
24 the laws given by him, could thus become an object of the citizens’
25 passions. According to Abbt, this would have a moralizing impact: rather
26 than pursuing their narrow individual and egoistic ends, citizens would be
27 elevated to contemplating some higher objective. As a consequence, the
28 citizen’s (*Bürger*) attachment to earthly things – and especially to one’s own
29 life – would be elevated to a sense of honour and glory.

30 However, the view that military service could contribute to the elevation
31 and moral education of the citizen was quite marginal in the debates of the
32 eighteenth century. Attempts to construct national citizenship within the
33 framework of the monarchical state were intrinsically contradictory. In fact,
34 the early modern state was characterized by its attempt to neutralize reli-
35 gious and political ‘opinions’ from the sphere of a bureaucratically backed
36 sovereignty and thus tended to exclude ideological struggles from the politi-
37 cal sphere. ‘Opinions’ such as religious faiths or political convictions were
38 thus relegated to the individual’s ‘inner moral space’.⁶ Absolutist subjects
39 could have private opinions, and they could even share these opinions with
40 other individuals, but they were not part of any political community because
41 their political existence depended entirely on the state. The state, however,
42 excluded any feeling of belonging inasmuch as it banned all opinions. This
43 exclusion of all communitarian bonds was the reason for the transcendence
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1 of the state.⁷ Accordingly, there was hardly a possibility for soldiers or citizens
2 to identify with the state as Abbt advocated it.

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4 III

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6 This situation changed with the French Revolution. The citizen is now con-
7 ceived of as a part of the sovereign and is, as such, not only endowed with the
8 capacity of autonomous political action, but also with political ‘opinions’ in
9 contemporary parlance. Today, we would use the term ‘ideologies’. ‘Wars of
10 opinions’ seemed to be banned from Europe since the religious civil wars, and
11 especially conservative political and military observers were horrified by the
12 fact that, from 1792 onwards, these ‘barbaric’ wars of opinions reappeared on
13 the European scene.⁸ In contrast to wars that were waged for material inter-
14 ests, wars of opinion were more difficult to settle by compromise, because
15 each belligerent party was fighting for values. Wars fought for material inter-
16 ests were thought to be more likely to be limited, whereas wars of opinion
17 had a tendency to unlimited escalation, precisely because they were fought in
18 the name of values worth fighting and ultimately dying for.

19 However, which values precisely were involved? Many actors of the
20 French Revolution invoked the nation. For instance, Robespierre depicted
21 the French army as

22
23 the glory of the nation and of humanity; our virtuous warriors are
24 shouting *Vive la République* when marching towards victory; falling by
25 the enemy sword, their scream is *Vive la République*. Their last words are
26 hymns to liberty; their last sighs are vows to the fatherland.⁹

27
28 However, this quotation shows that the nation is here synonymous for a
29 whole series of politically key concepts: liberty, republicanism and even –
30 perhaps more surprisingly – humanity. Especially this last reference to
31 humanity conveys a universal value that seems utterly incongruent with
32 our modern understanding of the nation. It is interesting and puzzling that
33 the nation from the onset carried meanings that did not really fit into the
34 narrative of war of one nation against another. The same holds true for the
35 concepts of liberty and republicanism, because it is not immediately clear why
36 these should be the exclusive property of one nation rather than of another.

37 Even when looking at examples of nationalization of the armed forces in
38 a more traditional sense the picture does not become any clearer. In August
39 1792, a couple of months after the beginning of the war, the National
40 Assembly decided to disband units of foreign troops in France. Jacques Pierre
41 Brissot de Warville, adversary of Robespierre and one of the apologists of the
42 war within the Jacobin Club, presented a report to the Assembly in which
43 he explained the reasons why foreign units should be disbanded. His main
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1 point was that ‘free men ought to defend themselves’. In contrast to the
 2 Frenchmen who had recently conquered their political liberty, the Swiss
 3 units of the French army were depicted as ‘an isolated and particular force,
 4 foreign to our principles, to our system of government’.¹⁰ It would thus be
 5 an error to interpret Brissot’s argument as simply nationalistic. When he
 6 claims that the Swiss are not part of the French political community, this
 7 exclusion is not justified on ethnic, cultural or national ground in the mod-
 8 ern sense, but premised on political reasons. Brissot explicitly invoked the
 9 fact that the Swiss soldiers under French colours were actually not supposed
 10 to fight external enemies, but against the revolution within France. They
 11 were supposed to help a tyrant oppressing the French population.

12 This is a perfect expression of the fragility of the concept of the nation. As
 13 historical research on nationalism has amply demonstrated, the first meaning
 14 of the nation was political, rather than nationalist in the modern sense – it
 15 signified ‘the people’ and more precisely the sovereign people endowed with
 16 civil rights. Accordingly, the Swiss could be said not to belong to the nation
 17 exactly in the same sense in which the tyrant they were supposed to defend
 18 against the sovereign people was not a part of the nation in this understanding.

19 However, as Eric Hobsbawm argued in his standard account of *Nations and*
 20 *Nationalisms since 1780*,

21
 22 the very act of democratizing politics that is of turning subjects into citizens,
 23 tends to produce a populist consciousness which, seen in some light, is hard
 24 to distinguish from a national, even a chauvinist, patriotism – for if ‘the
 25 country’ is in some way ‘mine’, then it is more readily seen as preferable
 26 to those of foreigners, especially if these lack the rights and freedom of the
 27 true citizen.¹¹
 28

29 Brissot’s argument is one example among others of this fragile line where
 30 the older political understanding merges with the modern understanding of
 31 the nation in terms of a common culture or ethnicity.

32 IV

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 34 However, when looking at ego-documents from soldiers of the French
 35 Revolution it becomes clear that nationalist motivations in the modern
 36 sense hardly play a role. Where these soldiers expressed any intrinsic moti-
 37 vations, their rhetoric is political and they depict their fight as a fight for
 38 liberty and republicanism rather than in national terms. Their ideological
 39 mindset was indeed very close to the one expressed by intellectuals or politi-
 40 cal decision-makers like Robespierre. We thus find very often references to
 41 liberty,¹² the republic¹³ and the fatherland¹⁴ in the writings of soldiers of
 42 the French Revolution. Especially during the first years of revolutionary war
 43 soldiers considered themselves as fighters for liberty and human rights and
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1 were happy to be recognized as such by the population.¹⁵ Accordingly, they
 2 were unable to understand when this feeling was not shared by those they
 3 wanted to 'liberate'. A volunteer of 1792 described this disarray in front of
 4 civilians in Germany who 'behaved very badly, many fired on our troops; it
 5 was even said that they committed the inhumanity of throwing the sick out
 6 of the windows'.¹⁶ Hence, the population had to be brought to recognize the
 7 justice of revolutionary war. Another soldier wrote about 'rendering patri-
 8 otic the town by arms'¹⁷ and about 'warming up' the population's patriotism
 9 by threatening them with the 'holy guillotine' in order to 'bring them to
 10 reason'.¹⁸ On the other hand, in these years few soldiers stressed national
 11 belongings, and if they mentioned their 'Frenchness' in the face of the
 12 enemy, their concept of nationality conveys the same ambiguities as men-
 13 tioned above. The volunteer Joliclerc expressed this in the following words:
 14 'I like myself, but I like even more my family and I like more my fatherland
 15 than my family, and the entire world more than my fatherland. One needs
 16 always to be ready to sacrifice oneself.'¹⁹ These examples demonstrate that
 17 the nation was not per se a cause worth fighting for, but only inasmuch
 18 as it conveyed either a political meaning – liberty and republicanism – or
 19 as a potentially universal entity that embraced humanity as a whole. This
 20 concept of the nation bears little resemblance to modern nationalism.
 21 However, Joliclerc added that he felt 'French in the face of the enemy for
 22 the defence of the fatherland, which is a glorious cause that should animate
 23 the whole world'.²⁰ Here, the internal tension of the revolutionary concept
 24 of the nation becomes the most visible: the universal value of the fight for
 25 liberty and human rights ('that should animate the whole world') is clearly
 26 associated with the cause of the French army. The French Republic, in other
 27 words, is conceived of as the concrete historical embodiment of universal
 28 human values. It is only a small step from such a conception to the 'moral
 29 annihilation' of the enemy: if I fight for universal values of humankind, my
 30 enemy is of necessity conceived of as the enemy of these universal human
 31 values. If I embody humanity, my enemy embodies the non-human.

V

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 35 The same holds true when turning to the perhaps most prominent advo-
 36 cate of German nationalism of the period, the philosopher Johann Gottlob
 37 Fichte. In 1793 he published a *Beitrag zur Berichtigung der Urtheile des*
 38 *Publikums über die französische Revolution (Contribution to the Correction of the*
 39 *Judgement of the Public on the French Revolution)* which made him one of the
 40 most influential defenders of the French Revolution among the German
 41 intelligentsia, and this precisely at a time when most German intellectuals
 42 were horrified by the execution of Louis XVI in January 1793. Yet in a few
 43 years, in 1807–08, he gave a series of public lectures in Berlin, eventually
 44 published as *Addresses to the German Nation*, which became one of the most

1 influential texts of German nationalism. In these lectures, Fichte exhorts
 2 his fellow Germans to engage in a fight against the French occupation.
 3 Famously, Fichte conceptualized nationality in modern cultural terms, that
 4 is, foremost as a linguistic entity. Fichte is thus one of the most interesting
 5 sources that illustrate the shift from a revolutionary to a 'modern national-
 6 ism' during the early years of the nineteenth century.

7 Whereas the understanding of the nation at the end of the eighteenth
 8 century had been political and thus state-centred, Fichte conceives of the
 9 'nation' as independent from political organization. Hence Fichte paved the
 10 way for our modern understanding of nationality. Moreover, the nation is
 11 not only independent from but even prior to the state. In Fichte, the nation
 12 and the fatherland acquire an explicit spiritual meaning which makes them
 13 superior to the state. The state, by contrast, is not much more than the
 14 earthly organization of the superior spiritual ends, which are embodied in
 15 the nation. Fichte's philosophy of war directly derives from these premises.
 16 War gives rise to a 'revolutionary tension' within the state and 'active pat-
 17 riotism, voluntary sacrifice, and heroic sense' replaced the normal orderly
 18 obedience to the law.²¹ In other words, the spiritual superiority of the nation
 19 over the state becomes particularly visible in periods of war. When the
 20 fatherland was in danger, the normal administrative procedures on which
 21 the functioning of the state relied – including the rule of law – could be
 22 suspended.

23 However, besides these elements that gave rise to the perception of Fichte
 24 as one of the main intellectual protagonists of modern nationalism, his con-
 25 cept of the nation also contains key elements that bear resemblance to ear-
 26 lier conceptions. This concerns firstly his conception of language on which
 27 he bases the German nation. According to Fichte, the German language is
 28 superior to other languages because it is pure from foreign importations and
 29 thus 'alive'. And this means that, in the German language, each speech act
 30 represents spontaneously the totality of the historical and spiritual life of
 31 the nation. As a consequence, the 'spiritual culture' is in direct contact with
 32 the nation's life. The nation's life is a common good for everybody, which
 33 means that there can never be an absolute division between the different
 34 classes of the nation in Germany.²² The cultural and linguistic foundation of
 35 modern nationalism in Fichte thus also conveys an explicit social meaning,
 36 and both are indeed inseparably linked. According to Fichte, the spiritual
 37 superiority of German culture and language derived from the possibility of
 38 the equal political participation that it implied. At this point it becomes
 39 clear that even Fichte's cultural and language-based understanding of the
 40 nation is in continuity with more political accounts of the nation, such as in
 41 Abbé Sieyès 1789 revolutionary pamphlet *What is the Third Estate?* In Sieyès,
 42 the nation was directly assimilated to the third estate and thus to the pro-
 43 ductive part of the population, in contrast to the socially and economically
 44 useless second estate.²³ In other words, Sieyès described the nation as *demos*.

1 In his 1813 lectures at Berlin University *Über den Begriff des wahrhaftigen*
 2 *Krieges (On the Concept of True War)*, Fichte made a similar point.²⁴ Selfishness
 3 and private property were the distinctive features of the bygone period of
 4 absolutism (which he termed 'Zeitalter der vollendeten Sündhaftigkeit' – the
 5 'age of absolute sinfulness'). Consequently, the state was an 'institution of
 6 property-owners' ('Anstalt der Eigenthümer') and soldiers were mere mercenaries,
 7 fighting for money. This alienation was to cease in 1813. National
 8 war, in Fichte's understanding, also meant to supersede the class boundaries
 9 between property owners and the 'lower people'.²⁵ In other words, even in
 10 Fichte's spiritual and cultural construction of the nation, the social dimension
 11 was present and the motivation for fighting and for sacrifice was not
 12 wholly nationalist in the modern sense but also had a political and even a
 13 social dimension. Rather than a break with the ideas brought forward during
 14 the French Revolution, Fichte's culturally founded nationalism is in direct
 15 continuity with French revolutionary concepts of the nation.²⁶

VI

19 The last example is drawn from more ambiguous source material, that is
 20 ego-documents by German soldiers fighting under Napoleon's colours.²⁷
 21 Over a third of the soldiers in Napoleon's Russian campaign were not French
 22 nationals in the modern sense, but either conscripts from territories that had
 23 been annexed to the French Empire, or from contingents that Napoleon's
 24 allies had to deliver to the Emperor's war effort.²⁸ A number of these soldiers
 25 wrote memoirs after the events. Many of those were published in the course
 26 of the nineteenth century. Their experience is interesting because these men
 27 were fighting, in the era of awakening nationalism, for a foreign army and
 28 a foreign nation. The general finding concerning these ego-documents is
 29 that their own national belonging did not play a large role for these men.
 30 Despite the fact that German nationalism historically constituted itself
 31 primarily in opposition to the French,²⁹ the Franco-German antagonism was
 32 hardly ever a theme in itself. Rather, there was an oscillation between the
 33 first and the third person. Jakob Klaus, barber in his civil life and son of a
 34 day-labourer from Hassloch in South West Germany who was conscripted
 35 in 1807 into Napoleon's army, thus wrote in the same paragraph of 'the
 36 French' and of 'us French'.³⁰ For the most part, however, the narratives
 37 focused on the antagonism between the warring parties, that is Napoleon's
 38 army against their enemies, and clearly not on national boundaries. The
 39 latter only appeared in the framework of rivalries between different units
 40 within Napoleon's army, for instance contingents of the Rhine Federation
 41 versus native French units.³¹ Cultural or even linguistic problems do not
 42 seem to have played a role even in these cases. What played an important
 43 role, however, was a traditional military virtue: loyalty to a particular unit
 44 and its commander, including the supreme commander Napoleon.³² This

1 consideration directly led to the political evaluation of the fight and it is
 2 very striking to see that Germans under French colours adopted on several
 3 occasions the language of French political ideology. An officer thus depicted
 4 the war in Spain as a fight for a European league of nations and perpetual
 5 peace,³³ and an elementary school teacher from the Rhineland admits to
 6 having had troubles getting used to the 'new political conditions' after
 7 Waterloo: 'More than I had thought, my heart was attached, not to France,
 8 but to the Emperor [...] Most of the old war comrades, with whom I was in
 9 close contact, had the same feeling.'³⁴

10 It clearly results from these writings that the persona of 'the Emperor' is the
 11 product of Napoleonic ideology, that is, the personification of the results of
 12 the French Revolution. 'Napoleon', to put it bluntly, stands for popular sov-
 13 ereignty, rule of law and European enlightenment. The obvious conclusion is
 14 even more puzzling. The previous examples highlighted a tension between, on
 15 the one hand, the political meaning of the nation, which was in many cases
 16 even conceived of in terms of universal values, and, on the other, a reference to
 17 a particular 'nation' with its particular language, culture and history. Examples
 18 drawn from the French Revolution and early nineteenth-century German
 19 nationalism tended towards the association of the cause of the particular
 20 nation with the universal cause of humankind. Universality, so to speak, was
 21 'nationalized'. Ego-documents by 'foreign' soldiers under Napoleon suggest
 22 that the language of universal inclusiveness that characterized Napoleonic
 23 ideology also worked, at least to some extent, outside national boundaries.
 24 Even Germans drafted into the French army could thus adhere to the ideology
 25 of universal inclusion. At the same time, however, they were also aware of the
 26 exclusionary aspects of this inclusiveness.
 27

VII

30 The conclusion derived from these examples is unambiguous: the nation
 31 in its modern understanding played but a minor role in the justification of
 32 and the motivation in war during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
 33 centuries. Cultural and even linguistic differences, let alone ethnicity, were
 34 not a major concern for contemporary actors, be they political decision-
 35 makers, public intellectuals or soldiers. Within the military, traditional
 36 virtues like loyalty to specific units and their commanders were still of major
 37 importance. However, something new was progressively being added to
 38 these traditional virtues: a political meaning of the fight. As a consequence,
 39 the conceptual novelty, that is the language of the nation, remains primarily
 40 political in scope. The nation, in other words, stands for political or social issues
 41 rather than for culture or ethnicity. The nation in its modern understanding
 42 was no motivation for fight and sacrifice.

43 What do these findings teach us with regard to the 'post-heroic' concept
 44 of war, for which Luttwak famously argued?³⁵ The answer is twofold. On the

1 one hand, there is substantial historical evidence that contemporary actors
2 in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were indeed aware of
3 witnessing a major shift in military affairs away from what the modernizers
4 during the period called 'cabinet wars' of limited goals. New strategic and
5 tactical concepts emerged, among them those of decisive action, rapid con-
6 centration of forces, 'enthusiastic' heroism and so on. However, these changes
7 did not go unquestioned. When discussing Jomini and Clausewitz today, we
8 are in fact discussing different strands of modernizing military thought. Both
9 strategists expressed different versions of what Luttwak called 'Napoleonic'
10 warfare. However, the debates during that period had already raised some of
11 Luttwak's objections towards 'Napoleonic' warfare and its 'heroic' implica-
12 tions. This implied, most importantly, the question of casualties. French
13 strategist Jacques Antoine Hippolyte Count of Guibert thus deplored in his
14 1772 *Essai general de tactique* (*A General Essay on Tactics*) that a 'non-heroic'
15 approach to military affairs, that is, an approach that put too much empha-
16 sis on casualty avoidance, had disastrous political consequences.³⁶ However,
17 late eighteenth-century critics of modern mass warfare hinted at yet another
18 issue other than casualties. And this leads us to the second lesson to be drawn
19 from these historical considerations. As pointed out above, the nation as it
20 appeared in the political language of the revolutionary period had primar-
21 ily a political signification. It covered a semantic field that reached from
22 popular sovereignty to democracy via republicanism. This is arguably one of
23 the blind spots of Luttwak's argument. Heroic warfare, as invented during the
24 revolutionary wars, included an attachment of the citizen to the fundamental
25 values of a polity, whereas the 'pre-heroic' warriors of the eighteenth century
26 were criticized precisely for lacking these values. According to Guibert,

27
28 it is [the weakness of our governments] which, not being able to compose
29 our armies of citizens, men who have a zeal for the service, or soldiers,
30 not merely for the sake of gain, occasions them to be so numerous and
31 burthensome. It is that which, not knowing how to make honour their
32 reward, pays them with money alone.³⁷

33
34 Without martial virtues being disseminated throughout the population, military
35 apparatuses would become mere mechanical tools in the hands of governments,
36 and societies would abandon the sovereign right of the decision whether to go
37 to war to mere technical considerations. War, in other words, would become
38 undemocratic. This was the crucial point of the Enlightenment debates
39 about national armies and martial virtues. 'Heroic' concepts of war – while
40 giving way to the most deplorable excesses of militarism and nationalism –
41 were also a means to gain democratic sovereignty over the question of war and
42 peace. Heroism gave an answer to the core question of the political values for
43 which a war is worth being fought. And today's debates about post-heroic war-
44 fare should certainly not overlook this crucial achievement of heroism.

Notes

- 1
- 2
- 3 1. Most of the following examples are from Thomas Hippler, *Citizens, Soldiers*
- 4 *and National Armies: Military Service in France and Germany* (London: Routledge,
- 5 2008).
- 6 2. On Abbt see Benjamin W. Redekop, *Enlightenment and Community: Lessing, Abbt,*
- 7 *Herder, and the Quest for a German Public* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's
- 8 University Press, 2000), especially pp. 123–67.
- 9 3. The roots of the modern concepts of death for the fatherland in medieval political
- 10 theology are explicated by Ernst Kantorowicz, 'Pro Patria Mori in Medieval Political
- 11 Theology', in idem, *Selected Studies* (New York: Augustin, 1965), pp. 308–24.
- 12 4. Thomas Abbt, 'Vom Tode für das Vaterland', in Fritz Brüggemann (ed.),
- 13 *Der Siebenjährige Krieg im Spiegel der zeitgenössischen Literatur* (Leipzig: Reclam,
- 14 1935), p. 50.
- 15 5. See Montesquieu, *The Spirit of the Law* (Cambridge University Press, 1989),
- 16 pp. 22–5.
- 17 6. Reinhart Koselleck, *Critique and Crisis: Enlightenment and the Pathogenesis of*
- 18 *Modern Society* (Oxford: Berg, 1988), p. 38.
- 19 7. Hippler, *Citizens, Soldiers and National Armies*, p. 44.
- 20 8. See Johannes Kunisch and Herfried Münkler (eds.), *Die Wiedergeburt des Krieges*
- 21 *aus dem Geist der Revolution: Studien zum bellizistischen Diskurs des ausgehenden 18.*
- 22 *und beginnenden 19. Jahrhunderts* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1999).
- 23 9. Maximilien Robespierre, 'Sur les principes du gouvernement révolutionnaire',
- 24 in idem, *Discours et Rapports à la Convention* (Paris: Union Générale d'Éditions,
- 25 1965), p. 204.
- 26 10. Jacques Pierre Brissot de Warville, *Rapport... Sur le licenciement des Régimens Suisses*
- 27 *au service de la France* (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1792), pp. 3–4.
- 28 11. Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalisms since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*
- 29 (Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 88.
- 30 12. René Bouscayrol (ed.), *Cent lettres de soldats de l'an II* (Paris: Aux amateurs de
- 31 livres, 1987), p. 115.
- 32 13. *Service historique de l'armée de terre* (Vincennes, Xw49, Dossier Lettres de volon-
- 33 taires), p. 38.
- 34 14. *Service historique*, p. 41.
- 35 15. Marquant, *Carnet d'étapes du dragon Marquant: Démarches et actions de l'armée du*
- 36 *centre pendant la campagne de 1792*, ed. G. Vallée and G. Pariset (Paris-Nancy:
- 37 Berger-Levrault, 1898), p. 14.
- 38 16. 'Journal d'un volontaire au 10^e bataillon, composé de jeunes gens de la ville de
- 39 Versailles, parti le 21 septemre 1792; 1792–1795, Belgique, armée du Nord,
- 40 campagne de Hollande', in Albert Terrade (ed.), *Carnet historique* (1898), p. 508.
- 41 On this incident see also Fricasse, *Journal de marche d'un volontaire de 1792*, ed.
- 42 Lorédan Larchey (Paris, 1882), p. 56.
- 43 17. Pierre Girardon, *Lettres de Pierre Girardon, Officier barsuaubois, pendant les guerres*
- 44 *de la Révolution (1791–1799)*, ed. Louis Morin (Bar-sur-Aube: Lebois, 1898), p. 19
- (letter dated 13 March 1792).
18. Girardon, *Lettres*, p. 43 (letter dated 11 ventôse year II, which corresponds to
- 1 March 1794).
19. Joliclerc, *Volontaires aux Armées de la Révolution, ses lettres*, ed. Etienne Joliclerc
- (Paris: Perrin, no date), p. 229.
20. Joliclerc, *Volontaires aux Armées*, p. 163.

- 1 21. Johann Gottlob Fichte, 'Der Patriotismus und sein Gegenteil', in Reinhard
- 2 Lauth and Hans Gliwitzky (eds), *Gesamtausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der*
- 3 *Wissenschaften* (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstadt: Nachgelassene Schriften, 1964).
- 4 22. Johann Gottlob Fichte, *Addresses to the German Nation*, ed. G. A. Kelly (New York
- 5 and Evanston: Harper & Row, 1968), pp. 60–1.
- 6 23. Emmanuel Sieyès, *What Is the Third Estate?* (London and Dunmow: Pall Mall
- 7 Press, 1963), p. 57.
- 8 24. See Herfried Münkler, "'Wer sterben kann, wer will denn den zwingen' – Fichte
- 9 als Philosoph des Krieges', in Johannes Kunisch and Herfried Münkler (eds), *Die*
- 10 *Wiedergeburt des Krieges aus dem Geist der Revolution* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot,
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