I.

The Inversion of Meaning: War can be Peace, and Peace War

Cynics have argued that if Tolstoy were to publish his novel War and Peace today he would probably have chosen Peace-Restoring and Peace-Keeping Missions as a title. The notion of ‘war’ is increasingly banned from the official political vocabulary and we are more and more employing expressions such as ‘restoring peace’ when talking about the use of armed force in conflict. To put it even more clearly: we are using the word ‘peace’ when meaning ‘war’. The starting point for the idea of this volume stems from there, and from the perceived necessity to investigate what this paradoxical use of vocabulary tells us about our current situation. War can be peace, and peace war.

It would be an error, however, to presume that this inversion of meaning is just a matter of intellectual dishonesty. On the contrary, it displays the puzzling but undisputable fact that peace has become one of the fundamental values in politics today. In his foreword to the 2010 published Oxford International Encyclopaedia of Peace, the Dalai Lama states: ‘Peace, not war, is the basis of progress, the basis of happiness, the basis of improvement.’


However, if everybody agrees in condemning war and in aspiring for peace, does this mean that conflict has effectively disappeared? Obviously not. But to the extent that contentions are not enounced anymore in the language of war, they have to be enounced in the language of peace. And this is the precise reason why ‘peace’ has become such a disputed concept. As a core part of our political language peace is always contested and claimed by specific groups with specific interests. Yet this also implies that the usages of this concept are extremely different and even irreconcilable. Quite paradoxically peace is a polemical concept. Its specific usages bring forward and defend particular visions of politics and legitimacy which are of necessity opposed to other visions. One man’s peace is another man’s oppression and one man’s fight for justice is another man’s breach of a peaceful order. This is why the oxymoron of ‘peace as a polemic concept’ is plainly justified and this is why peace gives of necessity rise to paradoxes: peace is intrinsically polemical and contentious, while at the same time unavoidably repressing its contentious character.

When turning to historical scholarship in order to better understand this paradox, we realize that historical peace studies contributed to a considerable extent to the creation of this paradox and our conviction that the conceptual history of war and peace urgently needs to be readdressed stems from this insight. Historical peace studies developed in Western Europe and in North America during the Cold War era, partly taking up directions that had emerged in the inter-war period in Europe. Their research agenda was to replace the older fields of history of international relations and of military history with a focus on peace, rather than on international relations and on war. Already in 1959 the Peace Research Institute was founded in Oslo. In the United States a Peace History Society was founded in 1964 and thus in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, in the context of the Vietnam War. Another institutional focus was established in Western Germany with the foundation of the Arbeitskreis Historische Friedensforschung in 1984 and thus in the context of NATO’s double-track decision of 1979. In all these cases the institutional settings and the research agendas were closely linked to the concerns of peace movements between the 1960s and the 1980s.

On the ideological level peace movements in the Western world were heavily inspired by left-wing politics. In the particular political context of the Cold War this led to an ambiguous position. On the one hand, the scope of historical peace research in Western Europe and in the United States was quite clearly to construct a historical legacy on which to consolidate a political commitment against the Vietnam War or in the context of the nuclear confrontation which became more worrisome during the early 1980s. Peace studies during these years—which were to become an academic discipline embracing sociology, philosophy, history, law, and political sciences—were thus deliberately seeking to construct an intellectual alternative to hegemonic NATO concepts. On the other hand, this intellectual and political movement was also partly opposed to Soviet ideology. The intellectual solution for this tricky situation was to construct ‘peace’ as an alternative

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value with its distinct characteristics and a history of its own. This intellectual construction permitted the criticism of armed containment policies and NATO nuclear strategy, without, however, endorsing the Soviet position.

This construction and the particular historical and political context in which it took place gave rise to some epistemic orientations in peace history which were rarely reflected upon. Schematically, we can distinguish three areas, in which these epistemic orientations seem problematic in our eyes: the definition of peace as an entity endowed with an immutable essence and a distinct social locus (II), its construction as an independent political value (III), and finally the historiographic orientations which stemmed from these characteristics (IV).

II. The Trouble with De-Historicizing Peace

Between the 1960s and the 1980s, peace studies, as developed in the context of the peace movements in Europe and North America, were keen to construct a line of tradition. The intellectual actors’ own political commitment for the sake of peace would gain supplementary historical signification to the extent that historical peace studies would inscribe their own concrete causes into a longer tradition. Constructing this tradition obviously also meant constructing a homogenous object of their political and intellectual commitment: peace. Peace as a historical object is presented as an immutable and thus trans-historical entity. Peace history, in other words, tends to de-historicize its object; peace history is the history of the various struggles, in different historical contexts, in favour of the un-historical cause of peace. The contexts were changing but peace was not and peace history was the history of these contexts and not of peace ‘as such’. Placing the history of peace centre stage, means approaching the topic from the usages of the concept. In this respect our approach is clearly indebted to the methods of conceptual history and we depart indeed from the assumption that language, concepts, and the values conveyed by them are a precondition of human agency and thus of human history. At the same time, however, language, concepts and values are never fixed entities; they are always disputed and used for various purposes. On the one hand, there has to be some form of a common language without which there would be no possibility of a common action of any kind; on the other hand this language is always disputed, without which there would be no politics.

This volume tries to consequently historicize its object and it thus departs from the assumption that there is no stable entity called ‘peace’. Rather than being contraries, war and peace constitute themselves mutually in an unstable and contentious relationship. The starting point of this project was precisely to put the

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interconnections of war and peace to the forefront, and to address these entanglements through the category of ‘paradoxes of peace’.

The essentialized and un-historical object of peace history was also assigned a precise social locus. In the historical and ideological context in which peace history developed, war basically meant war between states and, more precisely, between nation states. According to Charles Tilly’s famous dictum ‘war made the state, and the state made war’.\(^5\) Peace studies, as it were, departed symmetrically from the assumption that ‘peace makes civil society, and civil society makes peace’. The story of peace as a trans-historical and thus un-historical object was basically a story opposing states and governments as the agents of war to civil society, both national and transnational, as the promoters of peace.

Yet this way of structuring the story overlooks some important features. At least from the times of the Roman Empire onwards, the European concept of peace could imply a hardly dissimulated justification for political domination. In his political will, the *Res Gestae*, Emperor Augustus, thus uses the verb *pacificari* (to pacify) when describing his military conquests: ‘I extended the boundaries of all the provinces which were bordered by races not yet subject to our empire. The provinces of the Gauls, the Spains, and Germany, bounded by the ocean from Gades to the mouth of the Elbe, I reduced to a state of peace (*pacavi*).’\(^6\) Apart from being a human aspiration, ‘peace’ is also a powerful ideological device for the moral, political, and juridical legitimation of conquest, hegemony, and of power inequalities. To put it bluntly: the stronger party in an asymmetrical power relation has a vested interest in the promotion of peace to the extent that open conflict would mean to put into question the legitimacy of the unequal power relation. Peace in other words, may signify imperial domination and the language of peace is in no way the exclusive property of powerless groups in society or networks in civil society, but can be, and actually was, used to justify imperial purposes.

Moreover, peace may also signify domestic domination. This is certainly why concepts such as ‘class war’ were invented during the nineteenth century. A contrario this expression stressed the fact that ‘peace’ may imply a social order based on inequality, injustice, and exploitation which has to be rejected as such. Peace languages, in other words, serve in certain cases to silence social protest—national as well as international/transnational, foreign as well as domestic. The war/peace nexus may also take even more intricate forms, for instance when international workers associations argue for the ‘class war’ and revolution on the domestic level and for international solidarity in order to promote peace.


Peace as a Polemic Concept

It is the ambition of this volume to put these entanglements centre stage. As a polemic and contentious notion, peace has no meaning as such and the various contributions in this volume are illustrations of different and context-specific usages of peace as a polemical concept. In the language of conceptual history we would say that peace is a ‘fundamental concept’, that is a concept which all kind of actors have to use and have to cope with. We try to point out for whom and thus against whom one was speaking and acting when promoting peace, and which hopes and which fears were attached from various sides to it. In doing so, we do not intend to attack the use of the term as such, but our aim is to investigate what the specific interests were and what specific actors meant when talking about peace.

There might have been a ‘strategic’ interest in presenting peace as an essentialized and thus un-historical entity during the Cold War era but the situation has arguably changed during the last decades and we feel that it is time to question this ‘strategic essentialism’ and to historicize and thus to de-essentialize the notion of peace. This is why we are addressing the question of what peace concretely means in different historical contexts, placing the paradoxes which peace generated at the forefront of attention. In other words, Nietzsche’s question of the ‘value of values’ is central to our endeavour.

III. The Trouble with Conceptualizing Peace as a Fundamental and Independent Value

In a situation of a perceived threat to the existence of humankind by nuclear destruction, peace was constructed not only as an entity with an immutable essence but was, moreover, conceptualized as a fundamental and independent value. In the context of the late Cold War, peace studies contributed to building up peace as an alternative value against Western values such as ‘freedom’—which had to be defended, by nuclear weapons if necessary—as well as against Soviet values such as class struggle. To be sure, both Western and Soviet ideologies were not opposed to peace as such, but in both cases the value of peace was dependent on other values, such as freedom, workers’ emancipation, justice, and so forth. Constructing peace as an independent and, what is more important, unconditional political, ethical, and legal value signified a deliberate ignoring of the conceptual under-determination of the term peace and a high intellectual price had to be paid for this intellectual operation.

If peace has acquired this exceptional political value during the Cold War era, this specific concept of peace is of very limited use in our very different historical situation today. The critical charge of peace as value stemmed precisely from the fact that it was situated between the two major blocks in global politics, which entailed a critical distance to both Western and Eastern concepts. Yet the post-1989 situation is distinctly different in this respect and an unconditional reference to peace has
arguably lost much of the critical impetus that it had at its inception and is at risk of degenerating into a pure apologetic history of the existing global order of things. To be sure, seeing peace as a value is no invention of the Cold War era. On the contrary, as a human aspiration peace has always been considered as a value. Yet the intellectual construction of this value has taken very different forms throughout history. Schematically peace can either be seen as dependent on other values or as an independent value. One of the most influential examples for the former position is Saint Augustine who distinguished ‘true peace’ from ‘false peace’ and defined the former as a ‘just order.’ Justice and order are thus the concepts from which the value of peace is derived. One can obviously ask the question of what ‘justice’ actually means and different conceptions of justice can affront each other. The important point is that the values from which peace draws its value can be made explicit and eventually be debated on. This is quite different in the second approach which tends to consider peace as an independent value. Drawing on Enlightenment concepts of peace, the last third of the twentieth century witnessed the rise of peace to a political a priori, that is, a concept that all actors have to endorse and a value that no one can put into question. However, in ascribing such an unconditional value to peace we not only run the risk of forgetting the contentious nature of peace but of deflating the concept of war and inflating the concept of peace. The long-term outcome was a hypocritical use of language in which we are not talking about war anymore, but about ‘humanitarian interventions’, ‘air strikes’, ‘stabilizing’, and ‘peace-keeping missions’, and so forth, often carried out not by identifiable political actors but by an ‘international community’ as an abstractly universal agent of peace. In contrast, this volume departs from the assumption that peace has never been, nor can it be, an independent value and it tries to map out the different, and even antagonistic values that were attached to peace by different actors in concrete historical situations.

Peace being not an independent but a ‘qualified value’ always meant a certain form of peace, implying a certain domestic and international order, the two being intimately linked. In nineteenth-century Europe, we thus see a large variety of political, ethical, and juridical norms on which peace was to be built; its doctrine based on the international level to a large extent on the liberal assumptions of eighteenth century political thinking which estimated autonomy and individual freedom and remained structurally quiet when it

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should handle tensions or conflicting obligations between Empires or states. The early attempts of the French Revolution to ‘export’ republicanism and eventually democracy were clearly linked to a European peace project, the idea being not so far removed from Kant’s assumption that peace can only be established between republican states. While being neither republican nor democratic, Napoleon’s Empire tried to impose upon Europe its vision of peace, based on the assumptions of popular sovereignty, civic rights, and the rule of law. After Napoleon’s fall, different peace concepts coexisted in Europe: peace as the renewal of the eighteenth-century idea of a political balance of power, peace as a system of regular interstate congresses, peace as the legacy of Enlightenment ideas of a European civil society, including an insistence on free-trade and colonialism; peace based on the recognition of the principle of nationality and of national self-determination; peace based on religiously founded principles of monarchical legitimacy; peace having to be achieved through transnational revolutionary solidarity between the exploited working-classes; peace as being based on the universalization of democratic participation rights; peace as technical and positivistic project promoted by the particular professional group of international lawyers and of peace movements. To put it in other words, each party had its own peace and the

political principles of which type of peace was to be built were not only very different, but even irreconcilable. On the level of conceptual history, we thus witness struggles for the imposition of peace concepts against rival and even clearly opposed concepts of peace.

IV. Dimensions Silenced: The Contentious Character of Claims for Peace

It is amazing to see how these facts are almost systematically eluded by most of the existing studies in peace history. Anyone comparing the bulk of the existing secondary literature on peace movements with source material will be struck by the gulf that separates the former from the latter. Standard accounts in historical peace studies present the struggles of men, women, and networks for the sake of peace, thus constructing a continuity of social and sometimes transnational networks that anticipate in many respects the political commitment of the bulk of peace historians themselves. When re-reading the sources, however, one cannot but be surprised by the fact that one dimension is almost completely silenced in the secondary literature. And this is precisely the contentious character of claims for peace. One standard argument brought forward by peace activists is for instance that—in order to bring about peace in Europe—the first thing to be done is to crush the enemies of peace. In other words, the call for peace is in many cases accompanied by a call to weapons:23 Si vis pacem, para bellum. It was one of the most astonishing findings in the work of this volume to become aware that the bulk of the existing literature was strangely low-key about these disturbing facts. As a consequence of this, we felt the necessity to place these paradoxes of peace at the centre of our attention. Telling the story of war and peace in black and white is not only disputable on a theoretical level, it is often quite simply wrong.

This volume is thus intended as a contribution to a critical re-writing of the contents around the concepts of war and peace and of their connections to other nineteenth-century European key concepts like sovereignty, empire, security, humanity, civilization and barbarism, Christendom, and colonialism. These disputed fields are mapped out in the various contributions to this volume. If our focus lies on Europe, we believe that any contribution to European history has to inscribe Europe 1815–1914 into the context of global history. If Europe has to be ‘provincialized’24 this concretely means for us to globalize it, to historicize and to locate it contextually. The same goes for the values and norms argued to be European when they are practised outside Europe.25 In this sense, the global intersections, that is the unequal power

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relations on a global scale needed to be addressed. This does not only imply taking account of class and gender positions in the field of international history, but also re-addressing the impact of global inequalities on the issue of nationalism and of nationalities. The older peace history has argued that the cause of peace was lost against the hegemony of nationalisms since the end of the nineteenth century. Here too, this way to tell the story is in its affinity to attempt to write a history of Europe as a history of European integration, culminating obviously with the European Union, as the institutional realization of a universal principle of peace. This history of progress also affects the view on the historiography of peace which suffers in post-1945 a-historical overestimations like the statement that ‘Views of peace have evolved within the field of peace studies, particularly since World War II’.26

Given the fact that nineteenth-century Europe witnessed such a vast variety of antagonistic ‘peaces’ this spatial and chronological setting seemed particularly fruitful as a starting point. It was arguably in nineteenth-century Europe that concepts which were to become hegemonic on the global scene first came to blossom. Saying this, however, we must be aware of the limits of this endeavour which also indicates a direction for future research. A global comparison of the different ‘indigenous’ conceptual histories of war and peace might thus be a fascinating perspective. There is probably no social formation that has not been compelled to conceptualize conflict and its settlement, both internally and externally. The conceptual, social, and political grounds on which this has been done are, however, distinctly different.

To give just a few examples: in contrast to the Western tradition the Chinese vocabulary distinguished between two words for peace: heping on the one hand, and wu on the other, the former being invested with encompassing metaphysical, social, and psychological contents, and the latter denoting more narrowly a peace treaty or a ceasefire. Moreover, the whole idea of peace is traditionally embedded in an imperial political theology, in which the Emperor represents the unity of harmony and stability within the political order of the state. He therefore is the upholder of peace. Under his ‘Mandate of Heaven, war is never supposed to occur, so if it does, it is considered an aberration to the natural state of peace’.27 In theory, non-violent solutions are preferred to direct confrontations and defensive warfare is preferred over wars of aggression, military force, and violence.28 It is clear, however, that this spiritual framework only holds true within the framework of imperial centralism.

The classical Arabic tradition addressed the ethical and psychological implications of the conceptual couple in yet another perspective. The Arabic language has actually two different words for war: harb and jihad. The first derives from the verb hariba or harraba, which means becoming angry; the adjective harib being

someone’s enemy and the noun *harab* despoliation or dispossession. The semantic field covered by *harab* thus denotes, first, the psychological condition of being angry, secondly the relation between enemies, and thirdly the goal of warfare, which is not the annihilation of an enemy but their despoliation. The second word for war, *jihad*, deriving from the verb *gahada*, signifies both war and the ethical struggle against disturbing passions of the soul. It thus comprises a part of what other traditions would understand as being part of the semantics of peace, rather than of war. In the Christian tradition, for instance, the harmony of the soul is not only addressed as being part of an overwhelming notion of peace, but ‘earthly peace’ is even dependent on the development of peace in the individuals’ souls. This, in turn, is only possible through the Christian faith. In striking contrast to this Christian tradition, the Islamic tradition addresses this issue through the language of war. There are two different sorts of *jihad*, major and minor. The ‘major *jihad*’ precisely refers to this struggle within the souls, the struggle for faith and against the passions. By contrast, ‘minor *jihad*’ refers to war. In both senses, *jihad* means combat, which requires the strength of the soul.

The word for peace in the Arabic language is *salm* or *salam*. In contrast to *jihad* it conveys the idea of submission to political and religious authority, as well as of tranquillity, security, and religious salvation. The link between these meanings is that one is safe and sound by submission to and respect for religion. The word Islam is in itself derived from this same origin and Islam originally signifies submission (i.e. to the divine commandments) which will make the individuals safe and sound, and hence peaceful in their souls.


One objection, however, could be raised against this deconstructivist approach. Does this way of proceeding not deprive us of any means to measure concrete practices against normative standards? Or, to put it in other words, does this approach not hamper any possibility to write a critical history of the international order, to the extent that one might be inclined to think that the very possibility of criticism depends on a normative standard against which concrete practices can be measured? This objection relies on the assumption that universal standards for the codification of norms in the international realm can be formulated. Our project, on the contrary, seeks to demonstrate that all normative systems are always and of necessity situated. They developed, in particular, historical, intellectual, and geostrategical contexts and their genesis should be

reconstructed in relation to their specific situations. The critical impact of our approach is accordingly to be found in its attempt to historicize and thus to destabilize these very normative orders. To be sure, this approach involves the assumption that social relations are fundamentally agonistic in character. The novelty of our approach is to be found in the fact that we apply this insight to the very category of peace. Rather than being an essential entity that describes a state of affairs among humans, peace is the object of dispute, contention, power struggles—and ultimately war.

The methodological choice adopted in this volume is thus to challenge the theoretical dualism to which the bulk of the theory and history of international relations still relies. We have spontaneously a tendency to distinguish between norms for political behaviour on the international sphere on the one hand, and concrete historical actions on the other; the latter being determined by selfish interests rather than by universal norms. It is our aim to challenge this dualistic structure of reasoning. To put it bluntly, we depart from the assumption that the world is one, rather than being split into a noumenal and a phenomenal part. Drawing on the conceptual arsenal of conceptual history, of discourse analysis and of Nietzsche’s genealogy we intend to ask how systems of normativity emerge within complex historical situations in which strategic competition and different motivational settings interact. Rather than distinguishing between normative orders on the one hand, and concrete historical situations on the other, we address the various entanglements between these two. We tend to deliberately exclude any duality between normative ideals and the practical realization of these ideals. This implies a conscious break with the neo-idealistic paradigm that is still hegemonic in the field of the history and theory of international relations. Normative orders are no abstract ideals but precisely one form of historical practice.

As such they are intimately linked to multi-layered power relations both on the international and on the domestic level. The blunt reason for this is that historical practice always and necessarily implies power relations.

At the same time, however, these power relations are never independent from normative systems without which it would be difficult to acquire any legitimacy. For instance, when the early modern territorial state imposed ‘security’ as one of its core-values, the operations implied both the formulation of normative framework, running from juridical measures to political philosophy (the most obvious example being Thomas Hobbes\(^{31}\)), and very concrete steps to gain control of the means for physical violence, through the setting-up of more or less centralized military and police apparatuses. And the same hold true for the semantics of war and peace, as well as the ulterior enlargement of the concept of security to the


international realm, which is clearly expressed in the syntagm of ‘collective security’ and its rise after the 1930s:

![Graph showing the sudden appearance and rise of 'collective security' after the 1930s](image1)

**Figure 1.1** The Sudden Appearance and Rise of ‘Collective Security’ After the 1930s
*Source: Google ngram viewer.*

However, it seems even more notable, that ‘security’ has clearly passed ‘peace’ in terms of popularity some decades ago. The idea of peace was/is externalized in political relations and attributed mainly to the outer relations of states; the domestic sphere now seeks for and speaks favourably of ‘security’:

![Graph showing 'security' defeats 'peace' in terms of popularity around 1980](image2)

**Figure 1.2** ‘Security’ Defeats ‘Peace’ In Terms of Popularity Around 1980
*Source: Google ngram viewer.*

Without any ambition to completeness, this volume maps out some of the ‘paradoxes of peace’ in nineteenth-century Europe. After the Napoleonic Wars the hegemonic order of the Great Powers stabilized their particular concept of peace and bound them to a code acceptable to a broad majority of state actors, that found measures to make sure that administrative and political elites in leading states internalize international norms and rules, as Matthias Schulz points out in his contribution. However, the politics of the Holy Alliance only fitted partially into the conservative mindset that called for military

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interventions against uprisings and revolutions that threaten peace and stability. As Adrian Brisku points out, the ideological origins of the Holy Alliance were much more intricate than one is often tended to believe and there was a clear liberal heritage, especially in the Tsar’s early attempts to set up a durable peace in Europe.

But also peace movements in civil society were far from embracing an unequivocal pacifism. As Thomas Hippler shows, transnational networks of nationalists called for interventions in favour of national minorities in their struggle for independence. The emergence of transnational pacifistic networks of liberal democrats generated the similar paradox of a democratic war against the enemies of democracy. One important feature was the gendered dimension of peace activism. On the one hand peace as a political cause is traditionally reserved to men alone but, on the other hand, one nineteenth-century strand of discourse conceptualized women as inherently more ‘peaceful’ than men. As a consequence, peace activism seemed to perfectly fit to female nature. Susan Zimmermann demonstrates how the peace activism of the most important international women’s organization of the time silently re-affirmed hierarchies in the international and national domestic order, how the organization secured peace in its own house by suppressing the representation of interest challenging the status quo in the international order, and how it failed to relate its peace discourse in a meaningful way to any real war among ‘civilized’ nations.

International lawyers were to define ‘peace’ more than any other profession at the beginning of the nineteenth century; but only when it turned out that their formal understanding did not suit the needs of a growing public debate and interests for a more elaborated concept that was not limited to a technical understanding, the concept of peace became re-materialized and the lawyers themselves started to engage in manifold ways in the projects for a peaceful international order around 1900, as Miloš Vec argues. This included a particular perspective on conflicts and dispute settlement in a world in which international courts hardly existed for their dissolution; thus, the situation is remarkably different from the domestic/intrastate relations where a juridification/legalization of conflicts through permanent courts and procedural law had taken place for centuries. The international lawyers confirmed, on the one hand, code as the definitive way, together with arbitration, to build peace in the constituted new system of international relations; on the other hand, the codification idea suffered obviously on the international level from weaknesses that undermined the international lawyer’s efforts to build a normative order that was positive and universal at the same time, as Eliana Augusti points out in her chapter. But even if that norm-setting agenda would succeed, the question remains open as to how the aim of peace could be enforced in the international community without the threat of war—the consequences of this paradox are explored in the chapter of Kristina Lovrić-Pernak.

Economic liberals argue that free trade was the necessary precondition for peace among nations. However, Niels P Petersson argues that economic barriers had to be opposed by military force in some cases, free trade thus becoming a cause for armed conflict rather than a remedy against war. Against the paradoxes of ‘cosmopolitical’ liberal economy some economists argued that some forms
Thomas Hippler and Miloš Vec

of protectionism were necessary in order to allow economic systems to develop unhindered by international competition. However, as Thomas Hopkins shows, this kind of economic nationalism was never remote from expansionist concerns and colonial ambitions. Lea Heimbeck points out how regulatory regimes dealing with the liquidation of state debts and state bankruptcies displayed that law and legal avoidance were mobilized simultaneously and they supported contradictory ideas of stabilizing peace and power intensification/force at the same time.

Colonial fanatics hold that peace was an essential precondition for the spreading of European civilization around the world. These ideas entered the discourse on barbarism and the ideas of the peace of the civilized that was based on manifold assumptions of religious paternalism (Stefan Kroll) and cultural inequality (Oliver Eberl). The transformation of the Ottoman Empire gives evidence of the domestic militarization of society and war that was required to participate in the Europeanizing mission for securing international peace. Mustafa Aksakal describes how an Ottoman elite that felt increasingly frustrated by their exclusion from the European Great Power system consciously used militarization and Islamization as political remedies. The volume is concluded with an essay by Bo Stråth that sheds light on the fundamental tensions of the languages of peace and war, and their intertwined strings of development since the Kantian project.

If the reader’s perception is that the various contributions to this volume deal in a critical sense with the term peace, our intentions would be fully matched. The language and ideology of peace has to be criticized as any other language and ideology as well, and history should be part of this criticism. There are numerous examples of how peace was instrumentalized for very particular interests. These often hypocritical languages have to be unveiled and discussed. Orwell’s newspeak slogan from 1984 that ‘war is peace’ reminds us once again of the necessity of that critical task and its manifold dimensions in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Accordingly our deconstructivist stance is by no means cynical, nor does it entail any kind of fatalism. If conceptual history reveals the pitfalls of language and the aporia of the possibilities of its instrumentalization and abuse the reason for this is that any human agency is dependent upon language. Consequently the historical subjects have necessarily to use concepts such as peace in order to speak and ultimately to act. In this respect our volume is not an attack on the use of the concept of peace, it is about the identification of certain sights and engagements, about the multiple entanglements and how people perceived peace. This intention does not imply the negation of the belief that peace is something right, but it wants to show the tragic sensibility of that position.